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What is wrong with “being a pill-taker”? The special case of statins 
Abstract 
In an interview study of decision-making about statins, many participants said they took pills 
regularly, yet described themselves as ‘not really pill-takers’. This paper explores this 
paradox and its implications. The practice of pill-taking itself can constitute a challenge to the 
presentation of moral adequacy, beyond the potential for rendering stigmatised illnesses 
visible. Meeting this challenge involves a complex process of calibrating often-conflicting 
moral imperatives: to be concerned, but not too concerned, over one’s health; to be informed, 
but not over-informed;  and deferential but not over-deferential to medical expertise. This 
calibration reflects a broader tension between rival tropes: embracing medical progress and 
resisting medicalisation. Participants who take statins present them as unquestionably 
necessary; ‘needing’ pills, as opposed to choosing to take them, serves as a defence against 
the devalued identity of being a pill-taker. However, needing to take statins offers an 
additional threat to identity, because taking statins is widely perceived to be an alternative 
strategy to ‘choosing a healthy lifestyle’. This perception underpins a responsibilising health 
promotion discourse that shapes and complicates the work participants do to avoid presenting 
themselves as ‘pill-takers’. The salience of this discourse should be acknowledged where 
discussions of medicalisation use statins as an example. 
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Introduction 
‘The....scenario - of whole populations taking a daily tablet to mitigate against unhealthy 
lifestyles - is far from attractive’ (Smeeth and Hemingway, 2012) 
Smeeth and Hemingway’s comment, written in response to a recommendation (Mihaylova 
and al, 2012) that statins should be offered at a lower threshold of cardiovascular risk than 
before, indicates a distaste for the idea of widespread pill-taking. Such distaste has become a 
trope over several decades, yet during these same decades people have come to take more 
pills than ever. This apparent paradox is explored in the study reported here, which looks at 
how participants talk about statin decisions. Many participants say they take pills regularly 
but also say they are not ‘pill-takers’. This article explores what people mean by ‘being a pill-
taker’, how they avoid presenting themselves in this implicitly undesirable way, and why it is 
particularly hard to legitimate statin-taking.  
Although offering statins to more people has been incorporated into health policy in the UK 
(NICE, 2014), the recommendation is the subject of ongoing controversy (Parish et al., 2015). 
In part, this controversy reflects a clash between two different discourses, with ‘a pill for 
every ill’ (Huxley, 1932) cast as a desirable goal of medical progress within a primarily-
biomedical discourse, but as ‘the spectre of a medicalised and medicated society’ (Crawford, 
1980) within a social science discourse. Central to this clash is an extension of the medical 
gaze outward from its old focus on sick individuals to encompass the whole population, 
redefining an ‘ill’, or medical problem. Armstrong (1995) describes this extension as making 
a central contribution to the evolution of ‘surveillance medicine’. His thesis is illustrated by 
considering cardiovascular disease and statins: as well as having illnesses like heart attacks or 
angina, individuals may now be diagnosed as being ‘at risk’ of future heart attacks and 
offered statins to reduce this risk.  
From the ‘medical progress’ perspective implicit in most biomedical research and practice, an 
expansion of the group of people who have an identifiable, treatable medical problem is to be 
welcomed, increasing the number of people who can benefit from medical interventions. 
Within this framing, ‘non-compliance’ with the proffered interventions  for instance, less 
than 50% of people prescribed statins still take them two years later (Jackevicius et al., 2002) 
 is ‘a major problem in health care’ (Vermeire et al., 2001), one for which solutions are 
sought by many researchers. Haynes et al (2008), for instance, review quantitative studies 
assessing interventions intended to overcome what Vermeire et al cast as ‘barriers to 
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adherence’; in the context of statins and cardiovascular screening, McNaughton and 
Shucksmith’s (2015) qualitative study seeks ‘reasons for (non)compliance’ with the risk-
reducing interventions offered. 
A countervailing narrative highlights the potential harms of the expansion of medicine’s 
remit into the management of ‘problems’ such as cardiovascular risk, and frames this 
expansion as medicalisation. As well as harms that medical diagnoses and interventions can 
do to individuals, including the social and psychological effects of being assigned a liminal, 
‘at risk’ status (Aronowitz, 2009, Scott et al., 2005), this narrative highlights wider concerns 
about governmental power and ‘healthism’ (Crawford, 1980), and reframes ‘non-compliance’ 
with medical advice as one possible product of a collection of self-regulation practices 
(Conrad, 1985). For instance, in a synthesis of qualitative evidence that highlights various 
concerns about harms of medication, Pound et al (2005) describe these concerns as 
contributing to ‘resistance’ to medication.  
Britten et al (2015) offer a nuanced account of the positioning of potential patients or 
consumers in relation to the two competing framings of ‘a pill for every ill’, describing the 
way patients involved in evaluating a new drug for their own condition look closely at its 
possible benefits and consider a wide range of potential caveats, rather than simply 
demanding or resisting additional medication. By repositioning ‘patients’ as ‘critical reflexive 
agents’ (Williams and Calnan, 1996), such accounts situate themselves within a literature on 
pharmaceuticalisation which foregrounds the agency of potential pill-takers. This emphasis is 
developed by Dew et al’s (2015) move away from focusing on medication as an object to be 
accepted or rejected, instead examining moral evaluations of medication practices.  
Adopting this focus on the practice of pill-taking (rather than on the pills themselves), this 
article considers the morally-infused identity work involved in one health decision: deciding 
whether to take statins. A substantial body of research examines statin decisions, 
documenting understandings of cholesterol (Sachs, 1996, Polak, 2016) and risk (Crinson et 
al., 2007, Farrimond et al., 2010) and the way these get used in decision-making (Gale et al., 
2011, Polak and Green, 2015b); but neither these nor more general accounts of resistance to 
medication or barriers to adherence seem adequate to explain why Smeeth and Hemingway 
(2012) find the ‘pill for every ill’ scenario inherently ‘unattractive’. An alternative 
explanation for their widely shared distaste centres on the identity potentially conferred by 
the practice of pill-taking. Eborall and Will’s (2011) analysis of decisions about aspirin 
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highlights the difference between explanations centred on the pills and their effects, and 
explanations centred on pill-taking as a practice. The authors attribute ‘dislike of taking pills’ 
to the standardly-reported range of concerns about the medication itself (Pound et al., 2005), 
which they describe as mitigated by the reassuring familiarity of aspirin and balanced against 
its perceived benefits; they then explicitly distinguish this pill-centred ‘dislike’ from the wish 
to ‘avoid being seen as a “pill-popper”’. This identity management is central to the account 
presented here. 
‘Identity work’ has long been a topic of analysis in studying the way people accommodate 
their chronic illnesses within a presentable biography (Radley, 1989). Resisting medication is 
often portrayed as a way of resisting an illness label; concerning asthma, for instance, Adams, 
Pill and Jones (1997) summarise an extensive literature (dating back to Goffman’s work on 
stigma) in their account of the work people do to avoid making their illness visible by using 
medication. In the same way, people might resist taking statins in order to avoid identifying 
themselves as having heart disease, and Farrimond et al (2010) found that even ‘being high 
risk’ was an identity that their participants worked to minimise or normalise. However, this 
account does not solve the puzzle highlighted here: people who comfortably talk about their 
health problems and describe taking lots of pills emphasise, like Eborall and Will’s 
participants, that they are ‘not pill-takers’. This article explores the way pill-taking constitutes 
a direct threat to a presentable identity, not just a threat mediated by spoiling a ‘healthy’ 
status: there is something inherently ‘wrong’ with being a pill-taker in general and a statin-
taker in particular.   
Methods 
Data were generated by interviewing 34 people who had been offered a statin: participants 
(aged 5387; 12 women; occupations including cleaner and company director) were recruited 
and interviewed face-to-face in community settings in East Anglia between 2011 and 2013. 
The choice to use non-clinical settings reflected the perception that decisions about long-term 
medication are distributed, involving multiple interactions rather than being enacted within 
clinical encounters (Rapley, 2008). An unforeseen advantage of conducting interviews at 
home was that twenty-two participants were interviewed with their partner. As discussed by 
Polak and Green (2015a), these couple interviews offered additional analytic purchase; they 
functioned as a hybrid between focus groups and individual interviews, facilitating 
exploration of the tensions negotiated and tacit resources drawn on in the process of making 
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decisions, while still providing a setting private enough to allow participants to discuss 
sensitive topics.   
Invitations to participate were made through community groups such as lunch clubs and an 
exercise class, and snowballing from initial participants. All interviews were conducted by 
the author, recorded, and transcribed verbatim. They were semi-structured, using a brief topic 
guide which included questions on participants’ health and how they looked after it, where 
their knowledge about health came from, and their decisions about and use of medication in 
general and statins in particular.  Ethical approval was obtained from the author’s institution. 
All names in this paper are pseudonyms, and identifying material has been removed. 
All participants identified themselves as ‘well’ when interviewed, although 16 had previously 
suffered a heart problem requiring urgent hospital admission (some did not specify the 
precise diagnosis, or expressed uncertainty about it); all these are referred to here as having 
had a heart attack. The analysis presented here does not compare people who had had heart 
attacks with people who had not; despite the clear biomedical distinction between these two 
groups, offered ‘secondary’ and ‘primary prevention’ respectively, Lytsy, Burell and 
Westerling (2010) found no difference between them regarding statin decisions. Polak (2016) 
supports this finding, highlighting the slippery distinction between ‘prevention’ and 
‘treatment’ in accounts of medication decisions, and the functional similarity between 
cholesterol and heart problems as reasons for taking statins.  
Almost all participants took regular medication. In the analysis presented, differences 
between such medications are not highlighted except in the section specifically concerning 
statins, where a comparison is made between the 23 participants taking statins and 
participants not taking them. 
Analysis employed elements of a grounded theory approach, in an iterative process whose 
rigour was increased by regular discussion with colleagues about coding decisions and 
analytic direction. The data were used as a source of insight not into what people thought or 
did, but into the discursive frameworks which make sense of what is said, an analytic 
approach exemplified by Green et al (2003) in their use of group interview data to illuminate 
the ‘rules of thumb’ governing food choices, rather than the choices themselves; and by 
Eborall and Will’s (2011) exploration of the clashes of norms which inform decisions about 
preventive medication. Radley and Billig (1996) advocate this focus on participants’ 
accounts, rather than on their health beliefs, as a way to study the way a presentable identity 
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is constituted. Here, participants’ accounts of their medication practices are cast as work they 
do to present themselves in a way they are comfortable with, and specifically are used to 
explain why presenting oneself as a ‘pill-taker’ is uncomfortable. 
Findings 
Too many pills: what is wrong with ‘being a pill-taker’? 
Larry, taking statins since his heart attack, exemplifies a paradox presented by many 
interviewees: although he describes taking four different pills every day, he says ‘I have 
never been, really a pill-taker’. His statement seems to reply to an unspoken accusation that 
he takes too many pills; the implication is that pill-taking is bad. This implication is 
supported by the finding that taking lots of pills is almost always presented as something 
done by other people; when talking about themselves, most people emphasise how few pills 
they take. The following exchange between Violet and her husband Jim exemplifies this: Jim 
responds with a defensive ‘but –’ to Violet’s story about some (other, unspecified) people 
taking too many pills for too long, pills they may not ‘need’. He is asking Violet to reassure 
him by agreeing that he is different from those others because he has reduced the number of 
pills steeply since coming out of hospital. 
Interviewer: Why would you say fewer pills is better? 
Violet: Well because sometimes you don’t need all the medication.... 
Jim: but the things I am on are just the two little pills in the morning I take now, don’t 
I? 
Talking more generally about her antipathy to pills, Gill explicitly references the trope that ‘a 
pill for every ill’ is a bad idea:  
Gill: Our lives are, run by tablets now....whatever’s wrong with you, you take a tablet 
Interviewer:  and is that a good thing? 
Gill: no because they don’t get to the root of the problem....the last 20 years now, 
everything is pills  
This anti-pill trope is prevalent in the data.  Its pervasiveness is perhaps illustrated by the fact 
that it is unthinkable that Yvonne would say she does ‘like taking drugs’, at least in this 
context: 
Yvonne: I don’t like taking drugs 
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Interviewer: Can you say why that is? 
Yvonne: Because it’s abnormal to the body 
Gill’s and Yvonne’s mentions of concerns that taking pills is ‘abnormal to the body’, or  that 
‘they don’t get to the root of the problem’, could be construed as indicating perceptions of 
pills as inherently undesirable objects, and thus as echoing the broad findings of much 
qualitative research on accounts of perceptions of medication. But these concerns are 
mentioned only when prompted by the interviewer’s questions, suggesting instead that their 
primary role in these accounts is to rationalise a morally-coloured distaste not for the pills 
themselves but for the practice of pill-taking.  
Distaste for pill-taking is indirectly visible in an extract from Kathy’s interview. Kathy is an 
exception to the general rule that taking lots of pills is something other people are described 
as doing, not oneself; she speaks at some length about the complexity of her pill regime, 
which involves taking ‘on average about 25 tablets a day’: 
Kathy: When people say I can do without them, I do wonder if there is as much wrong 
with them as they say there is, because most of the people I know who take them really 
really need them....They do react badly if they don’t [take them] 
Two features of this excerpt provide insight into the moral work of pill-taking. First, Kathy 
presents her account framed in a defensive reply to what ‘people say’; she is one of the 
people who ‘do react badly’ if she doesn’t take them, the ‘do’ emphasising the defiant tone of 
her statement. Second, her switch within this statement from the first to the third person, from 
people suggesting that she herself ‘can do without’ pills, to this applying to ‘people I know’, 
can be seen as a device for talking about something a bit embarrassing or shameful; Kathy’s 
use of this device suggests that pill-taking is inherently a bad thing, uncomfortable to admit 
to. The way she protects herself against the discomfort of this admission is by emphasising 
that she ‘really really need[s]’ her pills, and so is different from someone who takes pills she 
does not need; ‘need’ is presented as an impregnable defence against the tacit accusation that 
she takes too many pills.  
Exactly what constitutes need is often hard to pin down; Don and Mary’s exchange illustrates 
a common circularity in the data between the definition of need and the definition of ‘a 
condition’: 
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Don: If you can keep yourself healthy....then why should you take tablets, for anything 
at all? 
Mary: But if you have a condition you would –  
Don: Well if you have a condition well that’s right....we’ve had more than one.... 
episode, haven’t we, Mary, of where you needed medication. So that to me is a 
different sort of situation, to the one which I’m in, which is just....maintaining a 
healthy body. 
Like Don, many interviewees speak of ‘need’ as a binary entity which is either present or 
absent, and the condition for which pills are needed is often left unspecified, although 
explanations like Kathy’s ‘they do react badly if they don’t [take them]’ are sometimes 
added. However, such explanations are not offered for taking statins; as one participant 
explains, statins ‘are not immediate effect type of pills’. Instead, most present themselves as 
needing statins for two reasons which often co-exist: first, they need to treat their cholesterol 
level, which is thus reified as a condition, and second, a doctor has said they need to take 
them.  
Debbie: They tested your cholesterol.... 
Keith:....and they said it was about 6.9 and they put me on [statins] 
 
Larry: He pointed his finger at me and he said ‘If you want to live a normal life you 
take the tablets and you’ll live to be an old man....Don’t take the tablets and who 
knows what will happen’.  So, I have always taken my tablets 
 
Crucially, neither Keith nor Larry presents himself as choosing to take statins; instead both 
imply that they need to take them. Rather than seeking to pin down the meaning of ‘need’, 
considering its function in these accounts of medication-taking gives useful analytic 
purchase: participants use ‘need’ to protect them from the unwanted ‘pill-taker’ label, and 
what constitutes ‘need’ in this data is absence of choice. In the next excerpts, the distinction 
between needing to take pills and choosing to take them is indicated by Mike’s use of the 
word ‘consumers’, and by Ron’s mention of ‘affecting’ pills. These terms serve to emphasise 
that the speakers themselves are not people who choose to take pills: 
Eileen: We never take painkillers do we?  
Mike: No.  
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Eileen: I would have to be really, poorly you know.  
Mike: We have taken paracetamol a couple of times, but we are not really regular 
consumers are we 
 
Ron: I have never really taken pills have I...I’ve always been quite sporty....I have 
never affected pills 
The context in which Ron makes his remarks is illuminating: he is responding to an invitation 
to tell the story of how he came to be taking pills, and most of his long answer  describes his 
many sporting achievements in the past. By answering a question about pill-taking with a 
description of himself as a ‘sporty’ person, he indicates a tacit assumption that being the kind 
of person who ‘affect[s]’ (or chooses) pills is the antithesis of being ‘sporty’. Thus accounts 
of pill-taking articulate with concerns about identity: Ron’s identity as an admirably sporty 
person is not threatened by the fact that he now takes several kinds of pill, because he takes 
them only because he needs them. His story, like Eileen and Mike’s exchange, implies that 
some (unspecified, other) people choose to take pills they do not need; ‘needing’ pills and 
‘choosing’ to take them are presented as mutually exclusive. Thus talk about need can be 
seen as a shield against an unwanted identity, helping someone who takes pills to avoid 
presenting herself as a pill-taker; she only takes pills because she needs to, so cannot be 
accused of taking too many. However, this highlights a challenge: judging how many pills is 
‘just right’ rests on a complex process of evaluation. 
Sensible pill-taking: the challenge of calibration 
In this data, health practices such as pill-taking are frequently evaluated by comparisons with 
largely-tacit norms specifying, for instance, the right amount of concern about health. 
Barbara illustrates this, in her morally-coloured account of trying to avoid being ‘stupid’ and 
‘over’ reacting to ‘little’ pains: 
Barbara: You can imagine such awful things that a little ache and pain, and I try not 
to be stupid about it...I mean, not, not to get , over worked-up about everything 
Several interviewees indicate that calibrating just how worked-up one ought to get is tricky, 
and often involves balancing competing norms. Like most participants, for instance, Neil 
begins by making it clear that he tries not to take pills: 
 Neil: I avoid pills, I wouldn’t take pills for a headache not unless I had to 
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Then later he expands on this in a way which helps explain what he means by ‘I had to’, after 
describing having realised after his heart attack that for a while he had been ignoring pains 
which were probably early warnings of trouble. The next excerpt highlights the tension 
between responding to ‘continuous... pain’ and not responding to ‘a little niggle’; Neil 
contrasts his own prudent identity with the unacceptable one of being ‘just that way inclined’: 
Neil: I have learnt not to put up with something....if you’ve got a pain and it’s 
continuous, I don’t mean a little niggle because I’ve got a mother-in-law like that, she 
will phone up and go for anything, she’s just that way inclined 
This tension is further illustrated in an exchange where Claire and Walter work to reach 
agreement about the right time to call an ambulance if she gets chest pain after her recent 
heart attack. Here a three-way balance has to be struck, involving obeying doctors’ advice as 
well as stoicism and sensible caution: 
Claire: We called the ambulance out twice and it goes against my grain that I don’t 
want to be you know like Peter and the Wolf.  
Walter: But you don’t get a choice if you are in pain you cannot question that, 
because you don’t get a second chance. 
Claire: Well it is that little puffer if you take it twice you need to call and I am 
embarrassed to ring up, you know, I just think that I am not ill enough. 
Doctors’ advice is the subject of a further tension to be negotiated, between accepting it 
sensibly and obeying it unquestioningly. Many interviewees imply that if a doctor says you 
need the pills then it is ‘silly’ not to take them: 
Ann: A friend some years ago.…I thought ‘oh you silly woman, you’ve been 
prescribed them, you should stick to it’, but, she gave up 
Similarly, the way Frank speaks about being ‘a sort of person’ who heeds authority suggests 
he views this as a positive facet of his identity, rather than an unfortunate weakness: 
Frank: I’m not a sort of person who gives up on prescriptions – if somebody’s told me 
I ought to take something, I take it 
But deference to medical authority can be evaluated differently: Fiona, for instance, says that 
it is only thanks to luck that her husband Ron’s obedience, here framed as rather overly 
deferential, has not resulted in ‘any nasty experiences’.  
11 
 
Fiona: Ron does accept things like that.  He thinks doctors are gods and if they say 
something he’ll do it, and, but you’ve been lucky, because you’ve never had any, any 
nasty experiences with pills have you?   
Thus identity shapes and is shaped by health practices such as responding to doctors’ advice, 
and these practices are themselves informed by a collection of often-conflicting moral 
discourses. 
The alternative to over-deference to doctors’ orders is to collect information from other 
sources.  However, this too requires calibration to avoid doing either too much or too little. 
Two contrasting excerpts illustrate this: Fiona criticises herself for not seeking information 
about statins, while Colin defends himself against an implicit charge of excessive information 
seeking, distinguishing the way he ‘sometimes take[s] an interest’ from ‘hypochondria’. 
Fiona: I must admit it was very bad of me because I didn’t really look them up to see 
what they were, you know 
Colin: I probably read it somewhere 
Interviewer: So you...read a bit about such things 
Colin: I don’t – I’m not a hypochondriac, but if – I sometimes take an interest in these 
things 
Collecting too much information thus risks earning the undesirable label of ‘hypochondriac’. 
Indeed, several interviewees talk about too much information as liable to cause hypochondria, 
producing imaginary ailments. The list of potential side-effects in the pill packet was often 
mentioned as particularly likely to have this effect:    
Eileen: If you read all the side effects, you wouldn’t take them.   
Mike: Well that’s right.  There are so many side effects, you know, you would be 
coughing and scratching!  
Eileen: Pages like that, I don’t know, we don’t read them. 
Claire and Walter, too, describe throwing away these information leaflets, because, as Walter 
says, ‘you can bog yourself down can’t you with the information’. To emphasise that 
throwing away the leaflet is a sensible precaution against the possible bad effects of reading 
it, they tell the story of a relative: she did not take this precaution, but instead allowed herself 
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to be persuaded by the leaflets that pills were giving her side effects, thus depriving herself of 
the benefits she would have gained from taking them: 
Claire: She read all the leaflets, not to find out what it would do good for you, but the 
side effects, you see. 
Walter: That was her main priority, side effects... 
Claire: and she would say it doesn’t suit me, tried it a couple of times and  
Walter:  that was it, bang. 
Claire:....obviously her health declined. 
Thus gathering too much information may lead someone to take fewer pills than she needs, as 
well as (in the standard picture of a hypochondriac) leading him to take too many pills 
because of too much concern about his health, as Larry describes his father doing: 
Larry: [He] was on something like 22 tablets a day....but he was a hypochondriac  
Concern about one’s health is the subject of another tricky calibration process. Many people 
reference general knowledge about healthy eating, presenting themselves as careful and 
hence responsible (doing what ‘you have to’), as Don does: 
Don: I wouldn’t, have cakes, and so on, or a lot of pastry...sugar, it’s hidden in just 
about everything, isn’t it?...you have to be so, so careful 
But taking too much care is ‘faddy’, as both Bill and Peter suggest in these extracts: 
Bill: I think people get faddy, they find something like they’ve got to drink 2 litres of 
water a day 
Peter: You can’t spend your life self-analysing...You can’t become paranoid, because 
if you do it will dominate your whole life, and my life will not be dominated 
As well as marking one as faddy or paranoid, adopting good health behaviour is sometimes 
presented as being in tension with the requirement to enjoy life; Violet indicates an awareness 
of the need to balance these two rival imperatives: 
Violet: Well we eat lots of vegetables because we have got the allotment, don’t we. 
Mind, Jim has got quite a sweet tooth, he likes his chocolate.  We’ve all got vices....I 
don’t believe really that as you get older that you can’t have some of the things that 
you like....You’ve got to have some joys in life. 
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Contextual factors like age can modify the way a ‘just right’ level of pill-taking gets 
determined; different participants use differing yardsticks to assess the number of pills they 
take. This difference is visible in the contrast between the anti-pills stance indicated by most 
participants and the welcoming approval of pills by just a few. These few are mostly among 
the oldest participants, such as Ann: describing a group of friends of her age cheerfully 
comparing notes about their many pills over coffee, she says the pills ‘keep us going’; 
needing pills is presented as normal at her age. Chris is younger than Ann, but has already 
reached an age at which serious illness is normal in his family, and has outlived several 
colleagues: 
Yvonne: A lot of your colleagues sort of flaked out in their late fifties. 
Chris:  Oh blimey there was five of us... and we were all the same age funny enough...  
You know I am the only one left. 
Like Ann, he shifts the balance towards the acceptability of pill-taking, saying that pills ‘keep 
[him] alive’ and explicitly casting them as a benefit of medical progress: 
Chris: It’s drugs that keep us alive now....because both my parents, they both died in 
their 70’s....they had heart problems, but of course they didn’t have the medicine.... 
Both Ann and Chris seem comfortable identifying themselves as people who rely on pills, 
indicating no concern that they might be accused of taking too many. Chris’ lack of 
discomfort illustrates that age is itself calibrated not only chronologically but also through 
comparisons with other people like oneself. In this way, Chris implicitly presents himself as 
old enough to need lots of pills; hence pill-taking does not threaten his identity. 
These interviewees thus work to present themselves as taking just the right number of pills, a 
number defined by a complex set of calibrations in which several tensions are inextricably 
entangled: the task of making just the right amount of effort to regulate one’s health involves 
collecting the right amount of information about one’s pills, and paying the right amount of 
heed to doctors’ advice and to information about healthy behaviours. Paying too much 
attention to one’s health and health behaviour, or reading too much about one’s condition and 
treatment, makes one liable to be labelled as a hypochondriac, but paying too little attention 
is negligent. Heeding doctors’ advice (for example, advice to take pills) articulates with both 
self-regulation and information gathering: one aspect of self-regulation is deciding whether to 
follow doctors’ advice unquestioningly, or whether to check it against other sources of 
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information. These densely articulating and often conflicting moral imperatives inform 
medication decisions; people have to negotiate a way through the tangle in order to 
distinguish between their own necessary, sensible pill-taking and the way other people 
behave.  
People who take pills are so successful at presenting themselves as ‘not pill-takers’ that 
tensions between these two identities never surface in the data. Indeed, participants within a 
single interview draw on discourses both of the rejection of pill-taking and of the necessity 
for it. For instance Yvonne and her husband Chris, who both take several pills each day, 
move without apparent discomfort between her comment that ‘I don’t like taking drugs’ and 
his ‘It’s drugs that keep us alive now’. The potential contrast between these two comments is 
a component of the broader tension between the competing tropes of rejecting medicalisation 
and welcoming medical progress; Gill’s disapproving statement ‘now, whatever’s wrong with 
you, you take a tablet’ comes minutes before she echoes her husband’s enthusiasm about the 
heart treatment which they say has kept him alive beyond his biblically-defined span:  
Simon: I mean I’m 72 and each day I wake up, it’s a bonus really, is how I look at it 
Gill: three-score year and ten 
To these participants, the difference between taking pills which keep you alive and indulging 
in unnecessary pill-taking goes without saying; but considerable work is needed to 
demonstrate that their own medication practices are ‘just right’.  
Needing pills that you ought not to need: the special case of statins and heart problems 
Statins are one of a small group of drugs which are seen as dealing with a problem which 
could be also dealt with (or even avoided) by ‘good behaviour’; it is widely-shared common 
knowledge that you can keep your heart healthy by exercising more and eating less. Violet is 
one of many interviewees who reference this knowledge, talking here about the ways (other) 
people deal with concern about their cholesterol level; she does not take statins herself: 
“Given the option of a pill or diet I think people will take the pill.”. Violet’s account of a 
choice between pills and diet highlights the particular accusation which can be levelled 
against people who take statins: taking the pills can get cast as a ‘lazy’ or ‘easier’ option.  For 
a small minority of participants, this is acknowledged as an incentive for their own decision 
to take statins, as Jim and Geoff suggest: 
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Jim: I just eat what she puts in front of me you know [laughs]. I eat what I want and 
the statins do the rest I suppose. It’s a lazy attitude actually isn’t it 
Geoff: It’s a damn sight easier [taking statins]....than running 5 miles a day and only 
eating vegetables  
However, most people who explicitly frame ‘pill or diet’ as alternative ways of addressing 
health concerns have declined statins. They present this decision as choosing the ‘virtuous’ 
option instead of the pills: 
Ed: I will do regular exercise, regular shopping at the farmers’ market, regular 
cooking for myself....if I can get into those regular habits, then I hope I can avoid 
getting into the regular habit of taking....pills 
This seems a simple statement of Ed’s preference, but can be recognised as morally-loaded in 
the light of background knowledge that exercise and eating in certain ways is widely regarded 
as good behaviour.  
In contrast, very few statin-takers present pills as an alternative to healthy ‘habits’; indeed 
many cite their healthy habits as the reason for their current good health. Larry (who takes 
statins) does this, in an account very like Ed’s:  
Larry: I used to go to the gym regular, I have a bike which I use a lot to go shopping 
and things like that…so I am quite healthy as it goes 
Don makes this moral colour even more visible; he talks of ‘just....taking care’ despite 
presenting himself earlier in the interview as needing (and taking) statins: 
Don: It’s just a matter of watching, what you eat, and taking care...if you do not need 
these things [pills] then do not take them... if you can keep yourself healthy, in terms 
of.... exercise, and a good...balanced diet....then everything should work ok, shouldn’t 
it? 
Don’s ‘everything should work ok’ suggests that good health behaviour deserves the reward 
of good health, an idea highlighted by the anger Peter expresses about having a heart attack in 
spite of his ‘healthy lifestyle’: 
Peter: There was all sorts of things that we didn’t do, so when I had a heart attack I 
was really annoyed because....we were not doing the bad things anyway, and we were 
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eating lots of fruit and....vegetables and, all those things you are supposed to do for a 
healthy lifestyle, and I still had a heart attack 
Thus almost everyone interviewed here emphasises their own good behaviour, whether or not 
they take statins, as Peter does. This linkage of health and behaviour inevitably implies that, 
at least in the context of heart disease, an illness is not just unpleasant in itself; it may also be 
an unwelcome indication of failure to behave well enough. This implication helps explain the 
discomfort or reluctance with which people speak about pill-taking even when it is clearly 
‘needed’ because of an unequivocally-diagnosed medical problem. In the next excerpt Vic, 
another statin-taker, makes efforts to mitigate this discomfort, both by playing down the size 
of the problem (he hesitates before mentioning his heart attack and then refers to it as ‘the 
little scare’) and by emphasising his fitness and his virtuous gym attendance: 
Vic: Dr Brown at our doctors....reckons that I am probably the fittest person on their 
books of my age....I am marginally fitter now than I was before I had the, if you like 
the little scare...because I go to the cardio gym....but when I compare myself to an 
awful lot of other people....they haven’t learnt by it and are not doing anything in 
comparison. 
These excerpts highlight the strong moral discourse about health promotion and self-
regulation that makes sense of Smeeth and Hemingway’s (2012) distaste for using tablets to 
‘mitigate against unhealthy lifestyles’; this discourse presents a major obstacle to legitimating 
a decision to take statins, and helps legitimate a decision to decline them, as indicated by 
several of those interviewees who are not taking statins. Almost all those who are taking 
statins work within their interviews to circumvent this obstacle so as to present an acceptable 
identity, emphasising their virtuous adoption of healthy behaviours (alongside their need to 
take statins and other pills) and thus distinguishing themselves from other people who are 
lazy pill-takers. With statins, as with medication in general, ‘need’ serves to legitimate pill-
taking, whereas choosing to take pills is something almost nobody describes themself as 
doing: Geoff is the only interviewee who explicitly presents virtuous health behaviours as an 
option which he has rejected, instead opting for statins, which he describes as ‘a light 
punishment for the sin of living badly’. Unsurprisingly, few other interviewees present 
themselves as sinners. 
Discussion 
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These findings describe the moral discourses used to legitimate taking medication in general 
and statins in particular. In foregrounding the way tensions between such discourses are 
negotiated, this article builds on Dew et al’s (2015) discussion of the moral discourses which 
inform the relationship between pharmaceuticals and identity and hence shape medication 
practices. However, examining how people come to take (or to decline) statins requires a 
further analytic move, situating these medication practices within a broader web of health 
practices informed by the widely-shared perception that statins are taken ‘to mitigate against 
unhealthy lifestyles’. Because of this perception, statin-takers have to defend themselves 
against two threats to a presentable identity: they stand tacitly accused not only of ‘being pill-
takers’ but also of having ‘unhealthy lifestyles’.  
Both these accusations imply a choice to take statins, so it is unsurprising that having ‘no 
choice’ is a particularly salient feature in statin-takers’ accounts in these data. Describing 
some of the clashes of norms negotiated by people considering aspirin, Eborall and Will 
(2011) highlight the way ‘need’ confers legitimacy on pill-taking. In these data, too, those 
who take pills emphasise that they need them; ‘a pill-taker’ is someone who takes more pills 
than they ‘really need’. Participants present ‘need’ as a binary quality, the antithesis of 
‘choice’: almost nobody describes themself as choosing to take pills, and several people state 
explicitly that they have no choice but to take them. This finding, that absence of choice is 
used to legitimate medication decisions, may help explain the low uptake reported by Will 
and Weiner (2015) in their study of over-the-counter statins. One plausible explanation of 
their finding that statins ‘don’t sell’ is that choosing to go and buy pills for oneself, as 
opposed to obeying doctors’ orders, threatens one of the main defences participants use 
against the ‘pill-taker’ accusation: one ‘needs’ pills if a doctor says so. This defence often 
articulates with ‘having a condition’, a status (discussed by Polak (2016)) whose circular 
relationship with ‘needing medication’ is implicit throughout these data. 
Yet while ‘need’ is a necessary constituent of legitimacy, it is not a sufficient one; some 
‘conditions’ are not morally neutral, for two reasons: either the elevation of a problem to 
‘condition’ status may be contested, or the condition may be of a kind that one ought to have 
avoided getting. Pain is an example of a problem whose legitimation of pill-taking is fragile – 
in these interviews, only other people take pills for ‘a little niggle’. Another example of 
fragile legitimacy concerns insomnia; Gabe et al (2015) describe the morally-charged 
negotiations involved in talk about sleeping pills. Like in the data here, Gabe and colleagues 
found ‘need’ was constituted either by having problems which functioned as a condition (in 
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participants they classify as ‘deserving’ pill-takers), or by ‘compliance’ with medical advice. 
This need was invoked to legitimate pill-taking, and balanced against concerns about side-
effects or addiction. In a group Gabe et al call ‘sinful’ pill-users, however, the fragility of 
insomnia as a legitimating condition is highlighted: without medical advice, its status falls 
below the threshold for legitimation, rendering pill-taking ‘naughty’. 
The threat to identity against which our participants defend themselves is different: those 
taking pills state unequivocally that they ‘really need’ them. The weakness in the legitimating 
process is not in the framing of cholesterol and heart problems as conditions, but in the 
stigma attached to these particular conditions. Crawford’s (1994) reflections on the cultural 
meanings of AIDS help to understand this stigma. Although heart disease is not infectious, it 
shares with AIDS the moral opprobrium derived from perceptions about lack of ‘self-
control’; elsewhere (1980) Crawford describes this as a component of healthism: ‘failure to 
maintain health is ascribed to …a failure of will’. The number of health problems liable to 
incur such blame is increasing as more are recognised as potentially ‘caused by lifestyle 
factors’; hence heart disease and statins constitute a useful case study, a context in which the 
anti-pill trope informs a preference for declining medication in favour of using will-power to 
make health-maintaining ‘lifestyle choices’.  
The health promotion discourse this reflects is surfaced here by participants’ frequent 
references to knowledge about cholesterol, diet and exercise, and by their morally-coloured 
accounts of health practices. This discourse incorporates widespread knowledge linking 
coronary candidacy to ‘unhealthy lifestyles’ (Angus et al., 2005, Davison et al., 1991, Weiner, 
2009), together with values concerning individual responsibility and autonomy. Having this 
knowledge (enough but not too much) is a constituent of constructing oneself as a responsible 
citizen, and as one has the autonomy to act upon it, it follows that someone needing statins is 
particularly likely to be accused of being ignorant, lazy or irresponsible. Autonomy can be 
seen as the obverse of dependency (on medical advice, for instance), but this binary framing 
fails to represent the complex calibration process seen in participants’ accounts of their health 
practices, where they work to resolve a tension between stubborn rejection and passive 
acceptance of doctors’ advice. This work exemplifies the wider enterprise of which it is a 
constituent, the enterprise of handling two rival tropes that inform medication practices, one 
framing ‘a pill for every ill’ as desirable medical progress while the other frames it as 
undesirable medicalisation. Rather than amalgamating competing tropes or balancing them 
against one another, this calibration work serves to ‘allow people to move between different 
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kinds of talk relatively smoothly’, as Will and Weiner (2014) describe in the context of talk 
about ‘healthy living’. Medication practices are thus informed and legitimated by a 
multiplicity of discourses, rather than a single unified one. 
As well as informing participants’ accounts, these multiple discourses are also visible in 
research and commentary about medication-taking, blurring the boundary between stances 
traditionally associated with either the biomedical or the social science community. In the 
biomedical literature, growing interest in ‘overdiagnosis’ or ‘too much medicine’ (Moynihan, 
2012) in recent years shows that an anti-medicalisation discourse is gaining ground; patient 
empowerment and choice are unquestioned goals in health policies and clinical training; and 
Smeeth and Hemingway’s (2012) comment voices an increasingly prevalent anti-
pharmaceuticalisation trope. Within the social science literature, this trope is sometimes 
implicitly in tension with a broader anti-medicalisation discourse that highlights the 
medicalising effect of individual responsibilisation for health and identifies healthism as ‘a 
form of  medicalisation’ (Crawford, 1980). The case of statins is used here to problematise 
that tension, highlighting the articulation between critiques of ‘dependency’ on doctors and 
pills (Crinson et al., 2007) and the growing valorisation of the autonomous, self-determining 
individual characterised by Crawford (1994) as a ‘bourgeois ideal’. This study suggests that 
those offered statins negotiate a complex tangle of conflicting norms which is perhaps too 
seldom considered by those who advise or study them. 
Conclusion 
Pill-taking can be an obstacle to presenting an acceptable identity. To legitimate taking 
medication, people present themselves as taking pills because they need them; it would be 
irresponsible or stupid not to take pills one needs. Needing statins, however, constitutes an 
extra threat to the enactment of moral adequacy, because of the well-recognised health 
promotion discourse which suggests that a healthy lifestyle can reduce cholesterol or prevent 
heart problems. Those who reject statins invoke this discourse. More surprisingly, statin-
takers indicate acceptance of it, too; most emphasise that they need statins despite their own 
virtuous lifestyle, rather than through choice. Their accounts reference both possible framings 
of ‘a pill for every ill’: by emphasising that pills ‘keep us alive’ one avoids presenting oneself 
as ‘a pill-taker’. 
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